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Over the last decade, public debate regarding the benefits 
and costs of teachers’ unions in public education has 
increased. This is apparent in the sizable amount of legisla-
tion and litigation considered in statehouses and courthouses 
and the unprecedented amount of labor action in school dis-
tricts around the nation. In 2018, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Janus v. AFSCME removed the 41-year-old precedent 
allowing public-sector unions to collect agency fees from 
employees who do not wish to join their union, which could 
decimate the ranks of teachers’ unions around the country 
(Marianno & Strunk, 2018a). Although not yet subject to 
supreme court review, there has also been a great deal of 
policy attention paid to teachers’ unions’ rights to collec-
tively bargain, and to the specific aspects over which they do 
negotiate with local school district boards and administra-
tions (Marianno, 2015). At the same time, teacher strikes 
around the country in 2018 and 2019 showcased renewed 
union activism, suggesting that teachers’ unions will con-
tinue to be a formidable force for advocating on behalf of 
teachers, notwithstanding the recent spate of unfavorable 
policy enactments and court rulings.
Much of the debate on teachers’ unions in public educa-
tion hinges on the productivity and efficiency effects of 
union activities. Those critical of teachers’ unions frequently 
argue that unions advocate for policies and negotiate lengthy 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that burden dis-
tricts and schools with overly rigid work rules. These work 
rules, critics argue, make operations inflexible to changing 
fiscal and accountability contexts and institutionalize costly 
procedures that are inefficient and ineffective ways to run 
schools (e.g., Ballou, 2000; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hess & 
Loup, 2008; Hess & West, 2006; Hoxby, 1996; Moe, 2001, 
2009). In contrast, those in support of teachers’ unions argue 
that the policies advocated for by unions and ensconced in 
agreements protect teachers from the arbitrary and capri-
cious behavior of administrators and afford them a voice in 
the policies that affect their work (e.g., Bascia & Rottmann, 
2011; Casey, 2006; Johnson & Donaldson, 2006; Kaboolian, 
2006).
While the research base on collective bargaining in public 
education is growing, the literature provides very few defini-
tive conclusions on the effects of this union activity to guide 
policymaker judgments on whether to reduce or expand 
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Abstract
While the effect of teachers’ unions on school districts continues to be debated, the research literature provides few 
definitive conclusions to guide these discussions. In this article, we examine the relationship between teachers’ union 
contracts and school district efficiency. We define efficiency as the ratio of short-run productivity (student performance on 
standardized exams) to expenditures. We estimate a series of school district fixed effect models using measures of district 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) restrictiveness tied to longitudinal outcomes. We find that CBA restrictiveness is 
positively associated with expenditures on students, instruction, instruction support services, and teacher and administrator 
salaries over time. We find no significant relationship between CBA restrictiveness and student achievement. Finally, we find 
a negative relationship between CBA restrictiveness and district efficiency. Given the small magnitude of our effect sizes, we 
conclude that weakening union rights may not produce large gains in efficiency and may come at substantial political costs.
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union rights (see Cowen & Strunk, 2015, for a review). In 
particular, most prior literature on the effect of local unions 
and contracts on resource inputs (i.e., district expenditures) 
and productive outputs (i.e., student learning) estimates these 
relationships at a single point in time, often with dichoto-
mous measures, making it difficult to assess how changes to 
local union strength and CBAs are associated with changes 
in resources and productivity. In addition, the effect of unions 
on resource inputs is often evaluated separately from the 
effect on productive outputs, with only a few exceptions 
(e.g., Brunner et al., 2019). Without a simultaneous under-
standing of the effect on both achievement and resource allo-
cation, we cannot draw clear conclusions about the benefits 
or costs of union activity in education.
In this article, we add to the literature about the effects of 
teachers’ unions on school district administration by using a 
longitudinal dataset from California school districts to esti-
mate the relationship between CBAs and district efficiency 
over time. We bring to bear a measure of CBA or contract 
restrictiveness that has been broadly used in the education 
literature, in which we define contract restrictiveness as the 
extent to which the CBAs negotiated between teachers’ 
unions and their school district counterparts impose restric-
tions on administrators in the management of day-to-day 
school operations (e.g., Goldhaber et al., 2013; Marianno 
et al., 2018; Marianno & Strunk, 2018b; Strunk et al., 2018, 
2019; Strunk & Grissom, 2010; Strunk & Reardon, 2010). 
Our measure of contract restrictiveness relies on a partial 
independence item response model that estimates the restric-
tiveness of approximately 500 California school district 
CBAs in place during the 2005–2006, 2008–2009, 2011–
2012, and 2014–2015 school years. We then model district 
expenditures, student achievement, and district efficiency 
(defined as a ratio of student achievement-to-district expen-
ditures) as a function of contract restrictiveness.
Once we account for district and year fixed effects, rela-
tionships between contract restrictiveness and student 
achievement are negative, but small and not significant. 
However, contract restrictiveness is positively associated 
with overall spending, including spending on instruction, 
instructional support services, and salaries for both teachers 
and administrators. Altogether, we find that a standard devia-
tion increase in contract restrictiveness is associated with a 
decrease in district efficiency of 1.3% to 2.4%.
This article proceeds as follows. The “Theoretical 
Perspectives on Teachers’ Unions and Efficiency” section 
provides background on the theoretical rationale for how 
teachers’ unions may influence productivity and efficiency. 
The “Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Teachers’ Unions 
on Operations” section outlines the exiting empirical litera-
ture on the topic. The “Data” section outlines the data and 
methods we use in our analysis. The “Empirical Strategy” 
section details our empirical strategy, and the “Results” sec-
tion provides the results. The “Discussion and Conclusion” 
section concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
our results for our theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the effect of unions on public education.
Theoretical Perspectives on Teachers’ 
Unions and Efficiency
In “What Do Unions Do?” Freeman and Medoff (1984) pro-
posed two faces of union power—monopoly and voice. 
These perspectives have formed the theoretical foundation 
for much of the empirical work on unions for more than three 
decades and provide theoretical expectations for how unions 
might influence school district efficiency (Gunderson, 2005).
The Monopoly or Rent-Seeking Union
The monopoly face of union power recognizes that by 
monopolizing the supply of labor to firms, unions acquire 
bargaining power that they can use to negotiate for wages 
and working conditions above what would be afforded in a 
competitive market (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kaufman, 
2004). For example, rent-seeking unions in education, due to 
their monopolistic power over the supply of teacher labor to 
public school districts and through their political coalitions, 
can advocate for patterns of school resource allocation that 
are consistent with teachers’ preferences, which may or may 
not coincide with resource allocations that have the highest 
marginal benefit for student learning (Hoxby, 1996). Thus, if 
union bargaining reallocates resources away from more pro-
ductive activities, then districts may face higher costs with-
out commensurate gains in student performance, leading to 
inefficiencies in the production of education as a result of 
union activity.
Union Voice
Borrowing on Hirschman’s (1970) exit-voice framework, 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) proposed that when unions rep-
resent the desires and preferences of their members, the 
actions they take through collective bargaining serve impor-
tant voice functions by affording employees the opportunity 
to raise grievances in lieu of exiting employment. Freeman 
and Medoff suggest several different reasons why the proxy 
exercise of employee voice by unions should enhance the 
productivity of inputs and thereby improve efficiency. First, 
the advancement of employee interests by the union should 
reduce employee turnover, which will lower hiring and train-
ing costs. Unions also implement procedures that link pro-
motions and rewards to seniority instead of to managerial 
prerogatives, which may reduce rivalry and increase collabo-
ration and informal training among employees. Unions can 
similarly enhance productivity by enforcing job standards 
and accountability for management such that firms can main-
tain productivity even as wages rise. Finally, unions can 
assess and communicate the desires of all employees so that 
management can better optimize the distribution of resources 
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between wages and working conditions and thereby raise the 
marginal productivity of their workforce.
In reality, unions likely embody both the monopoly and 
voice faces, and which dominates in practice is an open 
empirical question. In the next section, we discuss the exist-
ing evidence on the monopoly and voice effects of teachers’ 
unions and why a direct test of the efficiency effects of teach-
ers’ union activity is warranted.
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of 
Teachers’ Unions on Operations
Monopoly and voice theories of union power both find some 
support in the research literature. Evidence on the budgetary 
effects of teachers’ unions is largely found in economics and 
education journals dating back to the 1970s. These studies 
find that unionized and bargaining school districts have 
higher expenditures (Chambers, 1977; Duplantis et al., 1995; 
Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 1984, 1986; Gallagher, 1979; 
Hoxby, 1996), and many of these expenditures are directed 
toward increases in teacher salaries (Duplantis et al., 1995; 
Gallagher, 1979; Hoxby, 1996; Zwerling & Thomason, 
1995). In the state-level studies on the topic, Paglayan (2019) 
and Frandsen (2016) find that laws affording teachers the 
right to collectively bargaining did not lead to increases in 
the level of resources devoted to education.1 However, 
Brunner et al. (2019) find that districts in states with strong 
teachers’ unions increased local education expenditures fol-
lowing school finance reforms.
Most existing studies employ dichotomous indicators that 
capture the presence or absence of unions but are unable to 
empirically capture the influence of the activities unions 
engage in, like collective bargaining. This is particularly 
important in states where there is little variation in union sta-
tus because most teachers are unionized. New methodologi-
cal developments strive to solve this problem by generating 
a measure of contract restrictiveness built from an in-depth 
content analysis of individual contracts (Strunk & Reardon, 
2010). Drawing on over 600 provisions from teacher con-
tracts, the measure captures the degree to which a given CBA 
“restricts” the purview of school and district administrators 
in their management of the daily work of teachers (Goldhaber 
et al., 2013; Marianno et al., 2018; Strunk et al., 2018, 2019). 
Using such measures for a cross-section of school districts in 
California, Strunk (2011) finds that restrictive CBAs are 
associated with higher overall district expenditures and 
decreased spending on instructional materials.
Of course, if increases in public expenditures are met with 
commensurate returns to performance, then there may be 
improvements (or at least no loss) in efficiency because of 
union activities. The literature on the performance effects of 
teachers’ unions, however, is mixed (Cowen & Strunk, 2015; 
Goldhaber, 2006). Some studies find that students in union-
ized school districts perform significantly better than their 
nonunion counterparts (Argys & Rees, 1995; Eberts & Stone, 
1984, 1987; Milkman, 1997). These findings are consistent 
with the notion that union activity leads to productivity-
enhancing reallocations of resources by school districts.
A limitation of these early studies on unionization and 
productivity is that they assess relationships over a limited 
time horizon, generally in a single-year cross-section. 
Because unions are not randomly assigned to school districts 
but tend to arise in areas where working conditions are more 
difficult (e.g., Moe, 2009; Strunk, 2011, 2012; Strunk & 
McEachin, 2012), unobserved working conditions could lead 
to spurious relationships between unionization and produc-
tivity. More recent studies use identification strategies that 
attempt to account for the endogenous sorting of unions to 
workplaces by exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of 
union certification elections, union bargaining laws, or 
union-related policy changes, and find a negative effect or no 
effect of unionization on productivity (Hart & Sojourner, 
2015; Hoxby, 1996; Lott & Kenny, 2013; Lovenheim, 2009; 
Lovenheim & Willen, 2016; Quinby, 2017).2 Roth (2017) 
explores changes in teacher turnover and student achieve-
ment following the enactment of Wisconsin Act 10, which 
substantially reduced teacher bargaining rights, and finds 
that student performance improved in elementary grades 
where teachers retired following the reform. However, 
Baron’s (2018) later study finds that Wisconsin high school 
student achievement decreased as a result of Act 10. 
Marianno and Strunk (2018b) find that once time-invariant 
district working conditions are accounted for, the relation-
ship between contract restrictiveness and student achieve-
ment in California school districts is at worst small and 
negative and, at best, zero. Brunner et al. (2019) find that 
following school finance reforms, the increase in and reallo-
cation of local education expenditures associated with union 
influence translated into larger achievement gains. This 
could imply greater efficiency as a result of union activity.
Contributions of the Present Study
This study makes a few advancements over prior research. 
Altogether, the extant research finds some evidence that 
teachers’ unions are associated with increased costs for 
school districts, though their effects on productivity remain 
ambiguous. More importantly, we still know little about how 
changes in the intensity of union activities (not just the pres-
ence or absence of them) are associated with school district 
expenditures and student achievement. Most prior studies 
employ limited measures of unionization that fail to capture 
the degree of union activities (e.g., Argys & Rees, 1995; 
Eberts & Stone, 1987; Milkman, 1997). In this study, we uti-
lize a continuous measure of contract restrictiveness built on 
a close content analysis of CBAs over time.
More uncertain still are the implications of teachers’ 
unions on the efficiency of school districts, because few 
studies on teachers’ unions consider district inputs and out-
puts simultaneously. In short, it is not clear that we can infer 
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from prior research on the effect of unions on resource inputs 
and productivity outputs anything about the effect of union-
ization on efficiency. This is because our knowledge on the 
effect of unionization on resources (e.g., Chambers, 1977; 
Duplantis et al., 1995; Eberts, 1983) and the effect of union-
ization on productivity (e.g., Argys & Rees, 1995; Eberts & 
Stone, 1987; Hart & Sojourner, 2015; Lott & Kenny, 2013; 
Milkman, 1997; Moe, 2009) results mainly from separate 
studies performed in different contexts and time periods, on 
different samples, and with different identification strategies. 
We therefore build on prior research by employing a series of 
performance-to-expenditure ratios as more direct measures 
of the efficiency of public school districts (Ryan et al., 2017). 
As discussed below, a higher ratio of achievement-to-expen-
ditures suggests that districts are more productive at any 
given level of expenditure. We anticipate that if contract 
restrictiveness is indeed associated with the inefficient use of 
scarce resources, as suggested by union rent-seeking theo-
ries, then we would observe a negative relationship between 
contract restrictiveness and our achievement-to-expenditure 
ratios. In contrast, a positive relationship would support the 
union voice view, that bargaining improves the efficiency of 
district inputs by making district policy more effective.
Finally, as discussed above, much of the extant research on 
unions relies on cross-sectional data in which relationships 
are likely to be affected by unobserved differences between 
school districts. Instead, we use a longitudinal dataset that fol-
lows contract restrictiveness and school district productivity 
for approximately a decade. This enables us to use school dis-
trict and year fixed effects to account for unobserved factors 
related to contract restrictiveness, district inputs, and student 
achievement, all likely sources of bias in prior work.
Data
We draw on 11 years of school district data. As in prior work 
on teachers’ unions (e.g., Koski & Horng, 2007; Strunk, 
2011, 2012; Strunk & McEachin, 2012; Strunk & Reardon, 
2010), we limit analysis to districts in California. Our data-
base contains information on the CBAs from school districts 
in California with at least four schools. While this only 
includes approximately half of the nearly 1,000 school dis-
tricts that operate in California in each year, the labor-inten-
sive nature of collecting and analyzing several hundred 
CBAs over four bargaining cycles necessitates this limita-
tion. In addition, as shown in prior work (Strunk, 2012), the 
CBAs in very small districts look different than those in 
larger districts. For example, CBA provisions governing the 
manner in which teachers transfer between schools may 
serve little to no purpose in a district with only a few schools.
Contract Restrictiveness
One of the primary ways in which unions secure their inter-
ests is through collective bargaining or contract negotiations 
with employers on behalf of their membership. These agree-
ments can be fairly lengthy and contain hundreds of provi-
sions that set boundaries on the working relationship between 
personnel and administration (e.g., the length of the work-
day, the number and duration of faculty meetings). Strunk 
and Reardon (2010) pioneered a process by which to esti-
mate the degree to which contracts impose restrictions on the 
work of management using a partial independent item 
response (PIIR) model. The PIIR model operates on the 
premise that each CBA has a latent restrictiveness that can be 
inferred from the presence or absence of various provisions 
that constrain district operations (e.g., a provision limiting 
the length of the teacher workday to 7.25 hr or less), much as 
a correct or incorrect answer on a test can be used to infer a 
student’s latent understanding of a subject. Prior research 
finds that the resulting contract-based measure from the PIIR 
model is positively correlated with school board member 
perceptions of local union strength, the fraction of board 
members who received a union endorsement, union assis-
tance in fundraising, and union campaign volunteer support 
(Strunk & Grissom, 2010).
Following Strunk and Reardon (2010), we estimate the 
extent to which a CBA restricts district administrators by col-
lecting and analyzing CBAs from a selection of California 
school districts. Because California law requires that districts 
and unions negotiate new agreements at least every 3 years, 
we collected contracts once every 3 years beginning with 
contracts in place during the 2005–2006 school year, with 
subsequent collections taking place for the 2008–2009, 
2011–2012, and 2014–2015 school years.3 The average con-
tract length in California is approximately 94 single-spaced 
pages, with provisions spanning 15 general areas of the con-
tract—contract negotiations, association rights, compensa-
tion, class size, evaluation, grievances, benefits, layoffs, 
leaves, nonteaching duties, professional development, early 
retirement, retirement, school workday, and transfers. The 
mean length of time in which a CBA in our sample is active 
is 2.6 years, with 95% of CBAs spanning 3 years or less. We 
find that 19% of CBAs were first effective in the year of col-
lection, 33% were first effective in the year prior to collec-
tion, and 25% were first effective 2 years prior to collection.
We code the contract from each collection year for 253 
contract items across all 15 areas of the contract. To identify 
which of these items reliably indicate underlying restrictive-
ness, we conduct a Cronbach’s alpha item analysis to elimi-
nate weakly related items. We employ all years of data in the 
alpha item analysis, which reduced the 253 coded items to 
the 34 items presented in Online Appendix Table A1 (α = 
.83). These 34 items are then used to estimate each contract’s 
overall restrictiveness.
The PIIR model allows for the fact that some provisions 
will be interdependent such that a more restrictive provision 
can only be present if a less restrictive “gate” provision is 
also present (e.g., the teacher workday cannot be limited to 7 
hr or less unless it is also restricted to 7.25 hr or less). Thus, 
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while each contract provision is measured dichotomously 
based on its presence or absence, more and less restrictive 
provisions governing the same district behavior can also be 
incorporated by modeling their interdependence. The model 
is formally estimated as a hierarchical random effects model, 
taking into account this conditional (or gate) structure, as 
well as the fact that CBAs in our data are nested in years. We 
define Ykig as equal to one if restrictive item k is present in the 
contract in year i in district g, and zero otherwise, with hkig 
indicating similarly whether item k’s gate item is present. We 
further let ϕkig  equal the probability that Ykig  equals one 
conditional on hkig .























where D is a dummy variable indicating whether each provi-
sion is present in each contract, with γk  therefore capturing 
the conditional restrictiveness or severity of each item. θig  is 
a random effect for each contract, capturing that contract’s 
latent restrictiveness. τt  is a random effect for each year to 
capture year-to-year variation in restrictiveness common to 
all districts (contracts). After conditioning on the presence of 
other provisions in the contract, the latent restrictiveness of 
the contract is therefore estimated by the sum of θ ig and τ t, 
the district and year random effects.
Because the raw contract restrictiveness units are not 
immediately interpretable, we standardize the contract 
restrictiveness measures within year. Thus, contract restric-
tiveness in each year has a mean of zero and a standard devi-
ation of one (see Table 1, Row 1). However, understanding 
what a one standard deviation change in contract restrictive-
ness means in practical terms is still challenging. Using the 
conditional severities generated from the PIIR model (γk ) , 
we can further equate a standard deviation in contract restric-
tiveness to the probability that a given contract item is pres-
ent in the CBA.4 For example, consider that the probability 
that an average CBA specifies limitations on the length of 
faculty meetings is 55%. The probability increases to 66% 
for CBAs that are one standard deviation more restrictive. In 
addition, the likelihood that an average contract provides a 
full-time release to the union president for association busi-
ness is 45%, but the probability jumps to 57% for contracts 
that are one standard deviation above the mean. We provide 
the predicted marginal probabilities for all items in the con-
tract restrictiveness measure at one standard deviation above 
and below the mean of contract restrictiveness in Online 
Appendix Table A1.
District Inputs
Our primary measures of district inputs are expenditures, 
including overall expenditures and expenditures on specific 
categories of activity. Expenditure data come from the 
California Department of Education (CDE), which requires 
districts to report revenues and expenditures annually using a 
standardized account code structure (SACS). The SACS 
involves several levels of codes by which expenditures are 
associated with specific goals (e.g., vocational education), 
activities (e.g., curriculum development), and objects pur-
chased (e.g., certificated teacher salaries).
We construct two measures of aggregate expenditures. 
Following Ryan et al. (2017), our first measure is of student 
expenditures, which corresponds to what the CDE calculates 
as the “current expense of education” and is intended to cap-
ture expenditures that are both substantially discretionary 
and relevant to the day-to-day educational experiences of 
K-12 students. As a second measure of aggregate expendi-
ture, we calculate instructional expenditures, consisting of 
only those student expenditures explicitly associated with 
instruction.5
These measures of aggregate expenditures can be thought 
of as representing the level of district financial inputs into the 
educational process. However, CBAs may also affect the 
manner in which any given level of resources is allocated to 
various activities. We therefore further isolate spending on 
the specific subcategories of student expenditures considered 
previously by Strunk (2011). These subcategories of expen-
ditures include spending on all salaries, teacher salaries, 
administrator salaries, all staff benefits, classified staff ben-
efits, certificated staff benefits, instruction-related services, 
books and supplies, pupil services, and special activities 
overseen by the board of education and superintendent. All 
expenditure categories and the SACS codes by which they 
are identified are summarized in Online Appendix C.
We adjust expenditures for inflation using the consumer 
price index for all consumers so that they are measured 
in real (2014) dollars and for cost-of-living using the 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI), which facilitates compari-
sons across geographic areas by accounting for regional 
variation in the average cost of labor (Taylor & Fowler, 
2006). We construct all measures as expenditures-per-pupil 
and then use a natural log transformation to adjust the posi-
tive skew of the distribution. The second panel of Table 1 
presents summary statistics for these variables in 2014 dol-
lars before the log transformation. The table shows that the 
average California district in our sample expended approxi-
mately 12,182 dollars per pupil in 2006–2007. This number 
declined between 2009–2010 and 2012–2013, likely due to 
recessionary pressures, but increased again in 2015–2016 to 
12,779 dollars per pupil.
Changes to district inputs may manifest not only as 
changes in the levels or distribution of expenditures but also 
as changes in staffing if, for example, districts hire different 
numbers or types of staff. We therefore use district staffing 
data from the National Center for Education Statistics 
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student-to-administrator, and student-to-support staff ratios 
as well as the median years of teachers’ in-district experi-
ence. The third panel of Table 1 shows that the average dis-
trict in 2006–2007 maintained a student–teacher ratio of 20.7 
students per teacher. This number increases to as high as 23.7 
in 2012–2013 but decreases to 21.7 in 2015–2016. We 
observe similar patterns for the other staffing ratios.
District Achievement Outcomes
School districts are expected to achieve numerous and often 
difficult-to-measure outcomes. An exhaustive inventory of 
these outcomes, and thus a comprehensive evaluation of dis-
trict effectiveness, is therefore not feasible. Acknowledging 
this, we consider as measures of district effectiveness four 
student achievement outcomes that are often of practical and 
political interest and for which longitudinal data are readily 
available: student scores (standardized across all districts in 
the state in each year) and proficiency rates in math and 
English/language arts (ELA) on standardized exams. As 
shown in the fourth panel of Table 1, districts in our panel 
have achievement slightly above the state average, by 
roughly 10% of a district-level standard deviation in math 
and 16% of a standard deviation in ELA. Although average 
proficiency rates vary substantially over time, within any 
given year a one-unit increase in these standardized mea-
sures (e.g., the difference between a district with a standard-
ized achievement measure of zero and a district with a 
standardized measure of one) represents a change in the 
share of students who are rated proficient of roughly 16 to 18 
percentage points in both subjects.
District Efficiency Measures
To create measures of district efficiency, we follow Ryan 
et al. (2017), creating a series of efficiency ratios incorporat-
ing both school district inputs (expenditures) and outputs 
(achievement). Specifically, we create 12 efficiency ratios by 
dividing each district’s achievement outcomes in each year 
(math and ELA scores and proficiency rates) by its total 
per-pupil student expenditures, total per-pupil instructional 
expenditures, and total per-pupil salary expenditures. The 
resulting ratios do not have a concrete interpretation but have 
the attractive feature of implying that districts are more effi-
cient when their achievement levels are higher for a given 
level of expenditure or when their expenditures are lower at 
a given level of achievement. To facilitate interpretation, and 
because in some cases their distributions are somewhat 
skewed, we transform each ratio by its natural log. The sum-
mary statistics for the unlogged version of the measures 
using student expenditures are shown in the bottom panel of 
Table 1. Given the relatively small magnitude of average 
achievement (around .10 of a standard deviation in 2006–
2007 for math), and the relatively large size of average 
per-pupil district student expenditures (9,767 dollars per 
pupil in 2006–2007), the mean on the efficiency measures is 
extremely small (approximately zero) in each year. Summary 
statistics for the other efficiency measures are substantively 
similar.
Other District Characteristics
We control for several time-varying characteristics of school 
districts (see the top panel of Table 1) accounted for in prior 
work and shown to be related to district expenditures and 
student achievement, including the percentage of free and 
reduced price lunch students, the percentage of minority stu-
dents, the percentage of special education students, the per-
centage of English language learner students, the percentage 
of K-3 students, the percentage of Grade 7 through Grade 8 
students, the percentage of Grade 9 through Grade 12 stu-
dents, the natural log of student enrollment, and an indicator 
variable for whether the district is experiencing declining 
enrollment (Marianno & Strunk, 2018b). We derive mea-
sures of these district characteristics from the School and 
local education agency (LEA) Universe Surveys produced 
by the NCES and from public files released by the CDE.
Empirical Strategy
As discussed above, previous work has relied on cross-sec-
tional data to study the relationships between contract restric-
tiveness and school district achievement and expenditures. 
This has limited the extent to which estimates of those rela-
tionships can be interpreted causally because it is likely that 
they will be biased by unobserved heterogeneity across dis-
tricts. Our longitudinal data allow us to mitigate some 
(though not all) of these concerns by employing a fixed 
effect specification. Specifically, we estimate a series of 
models of the form:
      Ydt dt dt d t dt= + + + +−β β δ γ ε1 1 2Restrictiveness X ,  (2)
where Y is an outcome in district d in year t. Restrictiveness is 
our predictor of interest, a measure of contract restrictiveness 
calculated as described above. We use contract restrictiveness 
in the prior year because it seems likely that the CBA in effect 
in the previous year will have at least as much of an influence 
as the contemporaneous contract on district operations in a 
given year (because many district budgeting decisions will be 
made prior to the start of a given school year, for example).6 
Recall that the average time span for a contract in our sample 
is 2.6 years, with all CBAs being in effect in year t − 1, but 
with approximately 25% having been negotiated as early at 
t − 4. For these observations, β1  may capture a longer term 
effect than those observations with a first-year contract in t − 
1. X is a vector of time-varying district characteristics likely 
to affect district resource allocation and achievement.7 δd  is a 
set of district fixed effects to control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity between districts. γt  is a set of 
8 SAGE Open
year-specific dummy variables to control for changes over time 
that are common to all districts in our sample. ε  is an error 
term. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Key to the fixed effect identification strategy is the 
amount of within-district variation in contract restrictiveness 
over time. Figures D1 and D2 of Online Appendix D explore 
how contract restrictiveness changes over time using the 
unstandardized measure. Figure D1 of Online Appendix D 
plots average contract restrictiveness across the four bargain-
ing cycles (2005–2006, 2008–2009, 2011–2012, 2014–2015) 
and makes clear that unions are growing stronger over time in 
California. Average contract restrictiveness was −0.29 (SD = 
0.43) in 2005–2006 and was 0.18 (SD = 0.44) in 2014–2015, 
a change of 0.47, or just over a standard deviation. Figure D2 
of Online Appendix D plots the change in contract restrictive-
ness between negotiation cycles. The figure makes clear that 
change in contract restrictiveness between contract years is 
approximately normally distributed with an average change 
of 0.15 or approximately one third of a standard deviation. 
The figure further shows that while contract restrictiveness 
in most districts changes incrementally, several districts are 
on the tails of the distribution and experience substantial 
changes in contract restrictiveness between contract cycles. 
We further observe that for the median district in our sample, 
their most and least restrictive CBA over the life of the panel 
differs by 0.74 SD. For 90% of districts, their most and least 
restrictive CBAs differ by at least 0.11 SD. This suggests that 
we have adequate within-district variation for our fixed 
effect analyses.
The identifying assumption of the fixed effect model is 
that there are no time-varying factors correlated with con-
tract restrictiveness that also affect district expenditures, 
student achievement, and district efficiency. While this 
assumption cannot be proven definitely, as we do not observe 
all potential variables, Online Appendix E shows a series of 
models predicting changes in contract restrictiveness as a 
function of time-varying district-level characteristics. Online 
Appendix Table E1 showcases that there are few, if any, 
time-varying district characteristics that consistently predict 
changes in contract restrictiveness over time. In Online 
Appendix Table E2, we exploit the plausibly exogenous 
expiration of CBAs to explore whether a high-profile court 
case on union-protected state statutes, Vergara v. State of 
California (2014), and changes to the state school funding 
formula (Local Control Funding Formula [LCFF]) explain 
changes to contract restrictiveness over time.8 In short, we 
estimate a series of difference-in-difference models that 
compare the restrictiveness of CBAs that expired before 
Vergara and the implementation of the new state funding for-
mula, to CBAs that expired after the court case and new law 
had been enacted. We find that neither the court case nor the 
change in the funding formula drove changes to contract 
restrictiveness. Prior research on California CBAs also sug-
gests that overall restrictiveness did not change as a result of 
recessionary pressures (Strunk & Marianno, 2019). We test 
this identifying assumption further by running a series of 
models that control for future contract restrictiveness (Online 
Appendix G). If controlling for future contract restrictive-
ness changes our main estimates, then we may be concerned 
that there may be unaccounted for factors related to changes 
in contract restrictiveness, expenditures, and achievement. 
Online Appendix Table G1 shows that controlling for future 
contract restrictiveness does not change our main estimates.9 
In Online Appendix H, we add additional lags of contract 
restrictiveness to explore whether the effects of contract 
restrictiveness take years to play out. Online Appendix Table 
H1 also shows that controlling for multiple lags does not 
meaningfully change our main estimates.10 These tests add 




Table 2 presents estimates of the relationship between con-
tract restrictiveness and aggregate expenditure measures 
(Columns 1 and 2) and several other categories of expendi-
ture (Columns 3–6). Contract restrictiveness is positively 
and significantly related to student (at the 10% level) and 
instructional expenditures (at the 5% level); a one standard 
deviation increase in contract restrictiveness is associated 
with an increase in per-pupil student expenditures of approx-
imately 1.2% (p = .053) or US$111 for the median district 
in our sample.11
It is also useful to consider how district resource alloca-
tions vary with contract restrictiveness by considering sub-
categories of student spending. Overall spending increases 
are not evenly distributed across the budget. Instructional 
expenditures (those related to direct teacher–student interac-
tion) are positively related to contract restrictiveness and so 
too is spending on instruction-related services (i.e., services 
supporting teacher–student interaction). A standard deviation 
increase in contract restrictiveness is associated with an 
increase in per-pupil spending on instruction of 1.3%—
approximately US$73—and on instruction-related services 
of 1.9% or roughly US$20. This distinct category of expen-
ditures includes such activities as curriculum development, 
professional development, and general school administra-
tion. These increases do not appear to be driven by spending 
on books and supplies (a category that includes many, though 
not exclusively, expenditures dedicated to instruction and 
instruction-related services). Expenditures on pupil services 
and the operations of the school board and superintendent, 
activities considered distinct from the instructional catego-
ries above, have similar point estimates but are estimated 
less precisely, and are not statistically significant.
Table 3 presents results for expenditures on staff compen-
sation. Given the increases in instructional and instruction-
related service expenditures, it is again unsurprising to see 
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increased salaries, which make up a large portion of instruc-
tional expenditures, associated with contract restrictiveness. 
A one standard deviation increase in contract restrictiveness 
is associated with increased salary expenditures of 1.4%, 
consistent across both teachers and administrators. Because 
salary expenditures make up a substantial share of district 
Table 2. Fixed Effect Regressions of Per-Pupil Expenditures on Contract Restrictiveness.








Contract restrictiveness 0.012† (0.006) 0.013* (0.006) 0.019** (0.007) 0.004 (0.013) 0.012 (0.008) 0.016 (0.015)
% FRL −0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
% Minority students 0.002* (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
% SPED 0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) −0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) −0.009 (0.008)
% ELL −0.002* (0.001) −0.002* (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.003* (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.003 (0.002)
% K-3 −0.006 (0.005) −0.005 (0.005) −0.004 (0.006) −0.001 (0.010) −0.013* (0.006) −0.008 (0.007)
% Grades 7–8 0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) 0.003 (0.008) −0.005 (0.012) −0.002 (0.008) −0.019* (0.009)
% Grades 9–12 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.005) 0.004 (0.008) 0.000 (0.004) −0.008 (0.006)
ln(enrollment) −0.331** (0.106) −0.322* (0.134) −0.238* (0.095) −0.315* (0.147) −0.406** (0.147) −0.723*** (0.142)
Declining enrollment 0.021* (0.009) 0.023** (0.009) 0.031** (0.011) −0.006 (0.015) 0.023* (0.010) 0.026 (0.017)
District and year fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927
Districts 566 566 566 566 566 566
R2 .93 .93 .92 .89 .95 .94
Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation 
of one in each year. Financial outcomes are per-pupil and natural log transformed.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.
Table 3. Fixed Effect Regressions of Salary and Benefit Expenditures on Contract Restrictiveness.
Salaries Benefits
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables All Teachers Administrators All Certificated staff Classified staff
Contract 
restrictiveness
0.014* (0.006) 0.013* (0.006) 0.016* (0.007) 0.011 (0.007) 0.008 (0.008) 0.016* (0.008)
% FRL −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001)
% Minority students 0.001* (0.001) 0.001† (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002† (0.001)
% SPED 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) −0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)
% ELL −0.001† (0.001) −0.002* (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
% K-3 −0.005 (0.005) −0.005 (0.005) −0.003 (0.005) −0.008 (0.005) −0.008 (0.006) −0.009† (0.005)
% Grades 7–8 0.002 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) −0.002 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007)
% Grades 9–12 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) −0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004)
ln(enrollment) −0.363** (0.120) −0.346* (0.139) −0.411*** (0.097) −0.321** (0.117) −0.262* (0.130) −0.438*** (0.097)
Declining enrollment 0.025** (0.008) 0.026** (0.008) 0.021* (0.010) 0.024* (0.010) 0.025* (0.011) 0.021* (0.010)
District and year 
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927
Districts 566 566 566 566 566 566
R2 .94 .92 .93 .95 .94 .94
Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation 
of one in each year. Financial outcomes are per-pupil and natural log transformed.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.
10 SAGE Open
budgets, these increases may be of practical importance. For 
example, a 1.3% increase in teacher salary expenditure for 
the median district in our sample represents approximately 
US$48 per pupil or more than US$1,000 for a classroom of 
22 students. Similarly, a 1.6% increase in administrator sal-
ary expenditure for the median district is equivalent to US$9 
per pupil or US$5,589 for a school of average size (621 stu-
dents). Spending on nonwage compensation increases to a 
lesser degree and is only significant for classified staff.12
Spending on staff compensation can increase for a num-
ber of reasons, including raises negotiated into the salary 
schedule, increases in the education or experience levels of 
teachers, or changes in the number of staff per student. We 
consider several of these possibilities in Table 4. Increases 
in contract restrictiveness are associated with decreases in 
student-to-teacher and student-to-administrator ratios, sug-
gestive of increases in the number of these staff per student. 
These estimates are not statistically significant but are suf-
ficient in magnitude to explain a portion of observed 
increases in salary expenditures, particularly for adminis-
trators. The increase in the student-to-support staff ratio 
suggests that districts with stronger unions may shift staff 
away from pupil service roles (such as guidance counsel-
ors) and toward teaching and administrative staff, but this 
coefficient is imprecisely estimated. We find no evidence of 
changes in the average level of teacher experience; increases 
in teacher salary expenditures may therefore derive from 
increases in both the number of teachers and their overall 
salary levels.
District Outputs
As shown in Table 5, after controlling for district character-
istics, including district fixed effects, contract restrictiveness 
is not significantly related to student achievement outcomes. 
This is true for both math and ELA outcomes, and regardless 
of whether outcomes are measured in terms of average scores 
or student proficiency rates. This suggests that stronger 
unions are not necessarily detrimental to student achieve-
ment. However, estimates are consistently negative across all 
four achievement measures; if contract restrictiveness is not 
clearly linked to diminished student outcomes, we find even 
less evidence that student learning is enhanced.
District Efficiency
Evidence presented above shows that stronger unions are 
associated with higher levels of district spending but not with 
changes in achievement. If districts are spending more and 
student learning is not improving, this suggests that districts 
with stronger unions also tend to be less efficient. To test this 
formally, we estimate models with the efficiency ratios as 
outcomes (Table 6). Because these ratios are transformed by 
the natural logarithm, the coefficients can be interpreted 
roughly as percent changes in efficiency predicted by a stan-
dard deviation increase in contract restrictiveness.
As expected, estimates are uniformly negative and statis-
tically significant. Depending on the achievement and expen-
diture measure used, a standard deviation increase in contract 
Table 4. Fixed Effect Regressions of Staffing Inputs on Contract Restrictiveness.








Median teacher district 
experience
Contract restrictiveness −0.132 (0.083) −4.549 (3.672) 4.739 (11.089) 0.040 (0.109)
% FRL −0.005 (0.009) −0.174 (0.374) 0.561 (1.546) 0.003 (0.009)
% Minority students −0.012 (0.008) −0.314 (0.267) 0.243 (0.870) 0.012 (0.009)
% SPED 0.003 (0.045) −1.202 (1.982) −9.258† (5.491) 0.011 (0.087)
% ELL 0.008 (0.012) −0.411 (0.593) −0.949 (2.032) −0.037** (0.013)
% K-3 0.013 (0.054) −4.836† (2.701) −0.348 (5.516) −0.045 (0.070)
% Grades 7–8 −0.034 (0.071) −3.522 (2.955) 7.679 (9.406) 0.047 (0.084)
% Grades 9–12 0.072† (0.038) −2.741 (2.596) −4.353 (4.894) 0.134** (0.051)
ln(enrollment) 1.929* (0.821) 24.333 (37.097) 23.018 (68.583) −6.160*** (1.201)
Declining enrollment −0.238* (0.100) −5.669 (4.266) −12.662 (11.675) 0.253* (0.125)
District and year fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 1,920 1,918 1,899 1,906
Districts 565 564 557 561
R2 .85 .65 .64 .79
Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation 
of one in each year.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.
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restrictiveness is associated with a decrease in efficiency of 
1.3% to 2.4% (or 0.03–0.05 SD). Using the benchmarks sug-
gested by Kraft (2020), efficiency effects in the magnitude of 
0.03 to 0.05 SD can be considered small in size when com-
pared with those obtained from other educational interven-
tions. Back-of-the-envelope estimates based on these results 
imply that across all years of our data, a district with average 
student proficiency rates (46% in math and 52% in ELA) and 
average student spending per pupil (US$9,578) would be 
expected to spend roughly an additional US$200 (2%) per 
pupil with no change in student achievement for a standard 
deviation increase in contract restrictiveness.
Limitations
This study is not without a few limitations. First, we only 
measure efficiency using standardized achievement scores as 
our indicator of productive output. It could be that contract 
restrictiveness is associated with other productive benefits 
not fully captured by test-based measures of student learn-
ing. For example, a strong teacher CBA could build a more 
collaborative and caring school environment, which could 
result in improvements in teacher retention, student social-
emotional learning, absences, suspensions, and on-time 
grade progression. While these factors are likely correlated 
with performance on standardized exams, employing alter-
native measures of efficiency could yield a different result 
than the one observed in this article. In addition, standard-
ized tests only measure short-run student outcomes, making 
it impossible to say anything about the long-run effects of 
unions on school district efficiency. Unfortunately, given 
data constraints inherent to the California public datasets, we 
are unable to examine alternative measures of productivity.
Second, our results should not be interpreted as evidence 
that contract restrictiveness causes higher expenditures or 
overall district inefficiency. While we believe our estimates 
lean more toward causal evidence than those obtained in 
much of the prior work, they may still be susceptible to 
omitted variable bias, particularly from unobserved time-
varying confounders. This is certainly an avenue for future 
research, particularly as states reform their collective bar-
gaining regulations in ways that might allow for stronger 
causal identification.
Finally, our results do not generalize to all labor contexts. 
We generate estimates on the influence of teachers’ unions 
on school district efficiency by comparing districts along the 
margins of changes in contract restrictiveness. While doing 
so improves the internal validity of the estimates, it does 
limit, to some extent, the external validity of our study. These 
results are confined to California, where nearly all teachers 
in traditional public school districts are covered by a CBA 
and are represented by some of the strongest teachers’ unions 
in the nation (Winkler et al., 2013). Our results may not gen-
eralize to other states where not all teachers are represented 
by a union, where the scope of collective bargaining is differ-
ent, or where schools are funded differently. Instead, our 
results provide an understanding of the efficiency implica-
tions of teachers’ unions in a context where unions are 
Table 5. Fixed Effect Regressions of Student Achievement on Contract Restrictiveness.
Math ELA
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Score Proficiency Score Proficiency
Contract restrictiveness −0.018 (0.022) −0.022 (0.020) −0.004 (0.014) −0.010 (0.016)
% FRL −0.001 (0.002) −0.002 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001)
% Minority students −0.004† (0.002) −0.005** (0.002) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
% SPED −0.013 (0.010) −0.016† (0.009) −0.005 (0.007) −0.001 (0.007)
% ELL −0.003 (0.003) −0.002 (0.002) −0.006*** (0.002) −0.009*** (0.002)
% K-3 0.026** (0.010) 0.020* (0.009) 0.001 (0.006) −0.002 (0.007)
% Grades 7–8 0.031* (0.013) 0.028* (0.012) 0.015† (0.008) 0.014 (0.009)
% Grades 9–12 0.009 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005)
ln(enrollment) 0.155 (0.144) 0.195 (0.131) 0.218† (0.115) 0.123 (0.112)
Declining enrollment 0.008 (0.025) 0.018 (0.023) 0.029* (0.014) 0.024 (0.016)
District and year fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924
Districts 565 565 565 565
R2 .90 .91 .97 .96
Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and is standardized to have a standard 
deviation of one in each year. Achievement measures are standardized within year across all districts in California.
†p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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afforded a fairly robust scope for collective bargaining nego-
tiations in a labor-friendly state.
Discussion and Conclusion
More than three decades of research on teachers’ unions have 
failed to empirically resolve theoretical claims about the 
effects of unions on school districts. We build on prior work 
by using a unique panel dataset of a novel measure of con-
tract restrictiveness in a series of fixed effect models that 
control for time-invariant sources of omitted variable bias 
left unaccounted for in prior studies. Furthermore, we employ 
new measures of district efficiency that allow us to more 
directly explore the relationship between contract restrictive-
ness and the relative changes in district productive inputs and 
outputs over time.
We find some evidence that teachers’ unions are rent-
seeking organizations and highlight the importance of simul-
taneously considering their influences on expenditures and 
productivity levels. When estimating just the relationship 
between contract restrictiveness and productivity, one might 
conclude that unions have no adverse effects on operations. 
However, when considered alongside our estimates of 
increased district expenditure levels, the same results pro-
vide suggestive evidence that expenditures are made less 
efficient by rigid work rules advocated for by unions.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the effect 
sizes we observe are small in magnitude. We would likely 
observe different effects in locations where unions face more 
or less favorable legal and political climates. For example, 
compared with their counterparts in many other states, school 
districts in California are relatively dependent on state aid. 
This may limit the ability of local teachers’ unions to bargain 
for higher spending levels, attenuating our expenditure 
results relative to what might be observed elsewhere.
Similarly, our analyses focus on school districts and 
unions that change the restrictiveness of their CBAs over 
time. We cannot speak directly to other mechanisms by 
which unions might influence district operations or to the 
aggregate impacts of unionization. For example, stronger 
unions might influence district operations not only by bar-
gaining more restrictive CBAs but also by influencing school 
board elections (Strunk & Grissom, 2010) or inducing com-
petition from charter schools (Stoddard & Corcoran, 2007). 
The effects of increasing CBA restrictiveness might also be 
dwarfed by the effects of forming (or disbanding) a teachers’ 
union in the first place. On one hand, given that CBA restric-
tiveness is correlated with teachers’ union strength (Strunk & 
Grissom, 2010), our results may indicate that unions have 
qualitatively similar effects on districts when advancing their 
interests through those other mechanisms. On the other hand, 
the moderating role of context and the diverse roles played 
by teachers’ unions mean that our results should be general-
ized cautiously.
Nevertheless, our findings have important implications 
for policy. New legislative activity designed to curtail union 
rights is frequently based on the premise that union actions 
reduce school efficiency by hamstringing administrators. We 
provide evidence that limiting contract restrictiveness (e.g., 
loosening collective bargaining rules) might indeed provide 
school leaders with some additional flexibility to manage 
their finances more efficiently. However, our estimated effect 
sizes suggest that the benefits of such changes would be 
minimal.
In short, we find little to suggest that wholesale reductions 
of union power in education will drastically improve the effi-
ciency of school districts. But nor do we find evidence that 
status quo union power is benefiting students and schools. 
Our results suggest that a local, collaborative approach to 
modifying specific CBA policies that are the most detrimen-
tal to efficiency is warranted. Future research could help by 
identifying the specific policies that are the most helpful or 
harmful to district operations. Such an approach, built on 
evidence of the effects of collective bargaining and other 
union-supported policies, will maintain important teacher 
working conditions while removing obstacles to efficiency.
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Notes
 1. Paglayan (2019) does find that mandatory bargaining laws that 
did not limit a union’s right to strike led to small increases in 
educational spending.
 2. One exception is a study of unionization in California charter 
schools by Matsudaira and Patterson (2017). They find that 
unionization increases student achievement in mathematics 
but has no effect on English test scores.
 3. California law requires that collective bargaining agreements 
(CBAs) be renegotiated every 3 years, but districts and unions 
may choose to renegotiate CBAs more frequently. In addition, 
if contract negotiations are not completed within the 3-year win-
dow, the prior CBA remains effective until replaced. Thus, a 
CBA we observe as operational in any given year may have been 
renegotiated off-cycle or may be identical to the CBA observed 
in the district in previous or subsequent observations. About 13% 
of school districts in 2012 rolled over their 2009 CBA.
 4. The conditional severities (γk )  from the partial inde-
pendent item response (PIIR) model capture the value of 
contract restrictiveness at which a given item has 0.5 like-
lihood of appearing in a contract. The severities are eas-
ily converted into conditional probabilities at a given level 
of contract restrictiveness using the following formula: 
ϕ γ γk k ks s= + − + + −exp(( ) ) / ( exp(( ) ))x x1 , where γk  rep-
resents the conditional severity of the item, and x  and s  are 
constants that represent the sample mean and standard devia-
tion of contract restrictiveness. We can further convert the 
conditional probabilities into marginal probabilities by multi-
plying the conditional probability of a given item by the con-
ditional probabilities of its gate items.
 5. We also created a measure of total expenditures, which 
includes all district expenditures except for spending on adult 
or pre-kindergarten education. However, this measure contains 
a few additional categories of spending like capital outlays and 
facility acquisitions that are not as directly affected by contract 
language, that tend to fluctuate quite substantially from year 
to year, and that are often funded through alternative funding 
streams (like facility bonds). Consequently, the total expendi-
ture measures tend to contain more noise. Results from models 
using total expenditures are shown in Online Appendix B. The 
coefficients from these models tend to be larger in magnitude 
and less precisely estimated than the coefficients derived from 
models using student expenditures.
 6. In regressions not shown but available upon request, using a 
contemporaneous contract restrictiveness measure produces 
estimates that are qualitatively similar, though in some cases 
smaller in magnitude, to those derived using a lagged measure.
 7. In addition to being potentially associated with different costs, 
students in distinct grade levels are funded at disparate rates by 
the state and will thus be associated mechanically with differ-
ent resources.
 8. There may be concern that the implementation of the Local 
Control Funding Formula (LCFF, 2013, Cal. Educ. Code § 
42238.02) in California significantly altered the way districts 
spend money and the way they negotiate contracts. To assess 
this possibility, we estimate a difference-in-difference model 
exploring the relationship between contract negotiations and 
expenditure outcomes pre/post LCFF implementation. Treated 
districts are those that negotiated their contract after the 
implementation of LCFF. Control districts are those that nego-
tiated their contract before the implementation of LCFF (thus, 
the restrictiveness of their CBA was unaffected by the reform). 
We find much higher spending post LCFF (as expected) but no 
significant differences in expenditures for districts that negoti-
ated their CBA post LCFF (see Online Appendix Table F1).
 9. Online Appendix Table G1, Panel A, shows our main results 
as presented in the article. Online Appendix Table G1, Panel 
B, shows our main results dropping the last year of the panel. 
Online Appendix Table G1, Panel C, shows how our estimates 
change when controlling for future restrictiveness. Comparing 
Panel A with Panel B shows that the main change in the sta-
tistical significance of our results stems from dropping the last 
year of the panel. Panel C shows that future CBA restrictive-
ness is never predictive of current outcomes (Panel C) and 
coefficients on lagged CBA restrictiveness are essentially 
unchanged by additionally controlling for future CBA restric-
tiveness. This further bolsters our interpretation that the causal 
arrow runs from CBA restrictiveness to district outcomes 
rather than the other way around.
10. Including additional lags shrinks our estimation sample 
(because we do not have a lag for the 2005–2006 contracts). 
Although this has few implications for the size of our esti-
mates, we do lose statistical significance when dropping the 
first year of the panel (Online Appendix Table H1, Panel B). 
Panel C shows that CBAs from t-4 do not significantly predict 
any of these outcomes and when included as a control in the 
models, do not substantially change the size of our estimates 
for t − 1. This suggests that while the effects of CBAs may 
take some time to play out in districts, they can nevertheless 
play out over the relatively short term. This again bolsters the 
causal interpretation of our primary results, suggesting that 
they are not driven by preexisting district trends.
11. After accounting for fixed district characteristics, our point 
estimates for district inputs are much smaller than those found 
in prior work in California. For example, Strunk (2011) finds 
a significant positive relationship between contract restrictive-
ness and overall expenditures and student-related expenditures 
by about 13%. The decrease in the size of the estimates with 
the inclusion of the district fixed effects likely suggests that 
the cross-sectional estimates shown in prior work suffer from 
omitted variable bias.
12. This increase in classified staff benefits appears to be driven pri-
marily by increases on behalf of classified staff to public employ-
ees’ retirement system (PERS), Social Security, Medicare, and 
other alternative retirement plans. These costs account for 42% 
of classified staff benefit costs and (in regressions not shown) 
have significant increases similar in magnitude to classified 
benefits as a whole. Most other classified benefit costs (e.g., 
for health and welfare benefits) also appear to increase, but 
these coefficients are imprecisely estimated and not statistically 
significant.
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